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In their seminal paper Miller & Modigliani (1961) proposed the irrelevance of dividends, thereby initiating dividend theory. The rationale behind this proposition is that in perfect capital markets with rational behavior a firm's dividend policy will not affect its investment policy and can therefore have no impact on the valuation of the firm. The value of the firm will solely reflect future earnings and growth opportunities. Since the effect of increased dividends will merely be offset by the raising of new capital to fund the optimal investment policy, the firm's dividend policy will not affect investment and firm value. Miller & Modigliani (1961) , however, also recognized the potential for dividend announcements to contain information. This will be the case if dividend changes provide a signal of management's expectations regarding the future profits of the firm. The dividend change will then provide the occasion for a price change, but it will not be its cause.
This idea was elaborated on in the literature attempting to explain the existence of dividends with signalling models based on information asymmetries between management and shareholders (see for example Bhattacharya (1979) , Miller & Rock (1985) , and John & Williams (1985) ). A second explanation for the existence of dividends has been put forth by Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) and is based on agency conflicts between management and shareholders. Management is interested in increasing their power by allowing the firm to grow as large as possible. This gives them an incentive to waste free cash flow, that is cash flow in excess of what is needed to finance positive net present value projects, on unprofitable projects. Dividends can mitigate this problem by reducing the free cash flow available to management and forcing management to submit itself to the discipline of the financial markets. These two explanations for the existence of dividends both propose a market reaction to dividend announcements. However, while the signalling models pose purely an informational role for dividends, the free cash flow hypothesis sees dividends as having a real effect since they reduce overinvestment.
The empirical literature regarding the market reaction to dividend announcements is abundant and began with the conflicting studies by Pettit (1972) and Watts (1973) . Later studies by Ahorny & Swary (1980) , Kane, Lee & Marcus (1984) , Chang & Chen (1991) , and Leftwich & Zmijewski (1994) attempt to more explicitly control for the confounding effect of contemporaneous earnings announcements. In a similar vein Penman (1983) recognizes the possible impact of management's forecasts of earnings as a confounding event, and attempts to asses whether management's earnings forecasts or dividend announcements have greater information content. The results from these studies are conclusive in that they all find a market reaction to dividend announcements, and therefore conclude that there is information content in dividends. These studies on US data, however, suffer from the possible bias that management has deliberately selected contemporaneous announcement dates in an attempt to influence the impact on returns. Supporting this possibility Penman (1984) and Kalay & Loewenstein (1986) find evidence which suggests that management attempts to affect the stock market's reaction to the announcement of earnings and dividends through their choice of announcement dates. To overcome this bias Easton (1991) and Lonie, Abeyratna, Power & Sinclair (1996) utilized the consistent simultaneous announcement of dividends and earnings in Australia and the UK, respectively. Their results are consistent with the above in that both studies find evidence of an information content.
While these studies all found evidence of a market reaction to dividends, they were unable to uncover whether this reaction was due to dividends functioning as signals of variables relevant to the valuation of the firm or whether dividends in fact on their own had an impact on the value of the firm. If the latter is the case then dividends do in fact affect real considerations, in contradiction with the irrelevancy of dividends hypothesis proposed by Miller & Modigliani (1961) . Disentangling the informational and real effects of dividends requires that management and shareholders have symmetric information regarding current and future earnings at the time of the dividend announcement. Utilizing unique Japanese data Conroy, Eades & Harris (2000) was the first study to separate the two effects. In Japan dividends, earnings and management forecasts of next year's dividends and earnings are announced simultaneously, thereby enabling a disentangling of the market's reaction to the different information. Using this Japanese information environment Conroy et al. (2000) found that current dividend announcements were unable to explain any of the market's reaction to the announcements. These findings were interpreted as evidence supporting the irrelevancy of dividends. Thus, based on this study it seems that the Miller & Modigliani (1961) proposition holds. Once the possible information impact of dividend announcements has adequately been controlled for there is no market reaction to dividends supporting the proposition that they have no impact on real considerations with regards to future earnings and growth opportunities. These results could also be interpreted as indicating that current dividends contain no signal of future prosperity above and beyond that which is contained in current earnings and management forecasts of next year's earnings and dividends.
There are, however, some unique aspects of Japanese corporate governance that minimize the potential for Japanese dividends to have a real impact on the value of the firm. Specifically, several studies indicate that the potential for agency conflicts is less in Japan. Hodder & Tschoegl (1990) argue that Japanese firms have a very close and long-term relationship with their main bank. Often the main bank has access to extensive and confidential information on the firm's operations as well as future plans allowing it to perform a great deal of monitoring. Indeed, Sheard (1989) describes how the main bank system in Japan through its monitoring of firms, and intervention when necessary, alleviates agency conflicts and therefore substitutes for other methods of corporate control. Prowse (1990) posits that the agency problem in Japan is mitigated by the tendency for Japanese financial institutions to take large equity positions in the firms to which they lend. He finds evidence consistent with this notion. Additionally, Japanese firms use a great deal of short-term debt in their leverage, ensuring that they are constantly in the financial markets, which again allows for a great deal of monitoring of management. Gerlach (1992) uses the Japanese stockholder ownership patterns to argue that agency conflicts are 3 largely absent in Japan. He describes the complex overlapping ownership and business relationships that cause the distinction between shareholders as principals and managers as agents to blur and which in their most extreme form are exemplified in the keiretsu organization form. Indeed, the Japanese firm's leading shareholders are often other firms with which it conducts business and holds shares in. These reciprocal share crossholdings in effect constrain managers, diminishing the need for other forms of corporate control. These factors indicate that Japan is not a proper setting to test for a real effect of dividends, since the Japanese environment seems to lack the very elements that give rise to a real effect of dividends in the free cash flow hypothesis.
There are also several other unique features of the Japanese market that could be the underlying cause behind the finding that Japanese dividends contain no information above and beyond that which is in announcements of current earnings and management forecasts of next year's earnings and dividends. First, it seems that there is valid reason to believe that the information asymmetry between management and shareholders is less in Japan. As described in Gerlach (1992) the level of interaction between managers and shareholders is much more intense in Japan compared to the US. Additionally Hodder & Tschoegl (1990) and Gerlach (1992) note that a majority of Japanese shareholders have a longer investment horizon than US shareholders, since they basically hold shares to maintain or enhance business relationships. This indicates that they will be less interested in any short-term signals, since any information asymmetries will eventually be resolved in the long run.
A second unique aspect is that the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) virtually mandates a minimum annual cash dividend of 5 yen per share (10% of par value). In addition to this, dividends are fairly stable and close to this minimum level. Hodder & Tschoegl (1990) document that average dividends per share for First Section stocks that paid dividends fluctuated between 5.92 and 6.88 yen per share from 1960 through 1983. While it would appear that changing the dividend to a level below that mandated by TSE potentially carries much signal value to the market, it seems that a dividend above but close to the minimum mandated has little potential as a signal. Thus, a great majority of the Japanese dividends by nature of the Japanese stock market have little ability to function as a signal.
Finally, the simultaneous announcement of management's forecast of next year's dividend complicates the interpretation of the results. These dividend forecasts are fairly unique to the Japanese market and Conroy et al. (2000) find a significant market reaction to them. One possible explanation for this could be that if dividends function as signals of future earnings then forecasts of next year's dividends function as even better signals. While Conroy et al. (2000) argue that these forecasts of next year's dividends enable a clear separation of the real and informational effect of dividends it is unclear that this is indeed the case. It has often been argued that the signalling effect leaves management reluctant to cut dividends. A dividend increase therefore sends a strong signal to the market, since it can be interpreted as a commitment from management to pay this higher level of dividends in the future, and therefore must be due to high management expectations. Likewise, a dividend decrease is only undertaken when absolutely necessary. If the informational role of dividends indeed functions in this way, it is unclear that management's announcement of next year's expected dividends can be interpreted as containing the full informational effect, since such a statement does not carry as high a level of commitment as an actual increased dividend payout.
Hence, it is quite plausible that the findings in Conroy et al. (2000) are due to unique Japanese circumstances and therefore should be interpreted with caution. Perhaps their finding of no reaction to dividends is not due to a correct disentanglement of informational and real effects, where there are no real effects, but instead simply due to unique Japanese corporate governance issues that leave dividends with no informational or real effect to disentangle. Indeed, Dewenter & Warther (1998) find a smaller reaction to dividend initiations and omissions and less dividend smoothing in Japan compared to the US. They interpret their findings as due to the smaller degree of information asymmetry and agency conflicts in Japan, which leaves little role for dividends as either a signalling method or disciplinary mechanism. In line with this it is conceivable that the finding of no market reaction to the announcement of current dividends in Conroy et al. (2000) should not be interpreted so much as evidence for the Miller & Modigliani (1961) proposition of dividend irrelevancy, but more as a consequence of specific and unique Japanese circumstances.
The possibility that specific Japanese corporate governance features, at least in part, caused the findings in Conroy et al. (2000) points to the need for additional research in the area. Fortunately, the simultaneous announcement of current earnings, current dividends and management's forecasts of next year's earnings in Denmark make this possible. The objective of this study is therefore to utilize the Danish information environment around dividend announcements to disentangle the informational and real effects of dividend changes without the influence of the unique Japanese corporate governance issues that may have clouded the results of Conroy et al. (2000) . For this purpose we collect simultaneous announcements for Danish firms in the period from 1999 to 2004 and use the event study methodology to calculate abnormal returns around the announcements. We then regress these abnormal returns on the surprise component in earnings, dividends, and management's forecast of next year's earnings.
We find that the stock market reacts to the component of surprise in dividend announcements and management's forecast of next year's earnings. However, the surprise component of current earnings seems to carry no information, since we find no indication of a reaction to the announcement of current earnings when controlling for the other announcements. These results are robust to various sensitivity analyses. At a minimum, these results can be interpreted as indicating that dividend surprises contain an informational effect above and beyond that contained in management's forecast of next year's earnings. If it is assumed that management's forecasts of next year's earnings adequately control for any informational effect, the results can be interpreted as evidence that there is a real effect of dividends. Such an interpretation would contradict the dividend irrelevancy proposition in general.
Our findings of a stock market reaction to current dividend surprises are in sharp contrast to the findings in Conroy et al. (2000) . This indicates that their findings should be interpreted more as a result of the unique Japanese corporate governance environment than as evidence supporting the dividend irrelevancy proposition.
In the next section, we give a brief description of the Danish stock market and dividend announcements in Denmark. In section II we present the methodology of this study, while section III presents the data. Section IV examines the properties of dividend and earnings surprises in Denmark, and section V presents the basic results of our empirical tests. In section VI we perform robustness analysis of these results. Finally, conclusions are offered in section VII.
I Dividend Announcements in Denmark
This section examines the environment surrounding dividend announcements in Denmark. We start by giving a brief description of the Danish stock market. This is followed by a discussion of corporate governance issues pertaining to the ownership structure of Danish firms. From the recent literature in corporate governance on the ownership structure of firms, it is becoming evident that there are only a few countries in which the description of firms as widely held, first given in Berle & Means (1932) , is valid. Indeed, for Danish firms it is also the case that ownership is concentrated. The evidence presented in La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer (1999) and Pedersen & Thomsen (1997) indicates that the equity of Danish firms is seldom widely held and instead it is common that there is a significant owner of the firm. Additionally, this significant owner is often a family that holds management positions in the firm. Given this, it seems likely that the traditionally posed agency conflict between shareholders and management is lacking in many Danish firms. However, as noted in Shleifer & Vishny (1997) and La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (2000) this does not mean that an agency problem does not exist. Instead, one now arises between the control-ling shareholders and minority shareholders, since the former have the control to implement policies that benefit themselves at the expense of the latter. This agency problem like the one between management and shareholders can also be mitigated by the payment of dividends. Thus, while the ownership structure of Danish firms does not resemble that of the often widely held firms in the United States, it still gives rise to an agency problem, that theory posits has the potential to give dividends a real effect.
It is interesting to return briefly to the case of corporate governance in Japan. La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens, Djankov & Lang (2000) find that as in the United States and the United Kingdom the majority of firms in Japan are widely held. While this gives rise to a potential agency conflict between management and shareholders, there are unique circumstances in Japan such as the main banking relationship and cross-shareholdings that minimize such an agency conflict. This of course poses the question why corporate governance in other countries is not similar, since from an agency cost perspective this form of ownership structure seems optimal. While there are many explanations for this, naturally one is that there are other costs of this system. As Weinstein & Yafeh (1998) document most of the benefits of the main bank relationship accrue to the banks, for example in the form of higher interest payments, leading to a higher cost of capital for the firm. In relation to this study the interesting aspect is that the problems of expropriation that arise in the Japanese system can not be mitigated using dividends, thus leaving little possibility of a real effect of dividends in Japan.
In Denmark dividends are first announced in the preliminary announcements of annual accounts (PAA), and take the form of a proposed dividend for the current year. Since this dividend proposal is generally always accepted at the general meeting, the date of the PAA is also the dividend announcement date. All companies listed on the CSE are required to publicize PAAs. These are short versions of the annual report that are made public before the annual report, and at the latest on the same day. They contain the results for the completed fiscal year, a short description of the preceding year, the proposed dividend for the current year, and management's expectations regarding the future.
II Methodology
The methodology used in this study is the standard event study methodology, see for example Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay (1997). First we calculate the abnormal returns that the PAA generates in an event window around the announcement date. We then attempt to explain these abnormal returns by conducting cross-sectional regressions of the abnormal returns on the elements of new information contained in the announcement. That is the abnormal returns are regressed on measures of surprise pertaining to the announcement of current dividends, current earnings and management's forecasts of next year's earnings. This allows for the disentanglement of the different effects.
A Calculating Abnormal Returns
The part of a stock's return that concerns the firm's PAA is isolated by using a model to estimate the normal return, i.e. the stock's return if there had been no announcement . It is then assumed that the abnormal return that the PAA generates can be found as the difference between the actual return and the estimated normal return. There are several models that can be used to estimate the normal returns. This study uses the market model, which Brown & Warner (1985) find is well-specified under a variety of conditions when using daily returns. The market model for each firm is given as
where R j,t and R m,t denote the returns to stock j and the market portfolio on day t, respectively. Using ordinary least squares a market model is estimated for each firm in an estimation period running from 185 to 6 days before the announcement . One problem in this estimation is that the Danish stock market is characterized by having many stocks that trade infrequently, i.e. thin trading. There are two aspects to this problem. The first is that the registered closing stock prices can be from transactions made earlier in the day. It is a well known problem that this non-synchronous trading results in biased estimates of the market model parameters (see for example Brown and Warner (1985: 16) ). However, several studies have shown that the results of event studies are not changed noticeably, when alternative unbiased estimates are used (see Brown & Warner (1985) and Dyckman, Philbrick & Stephan (1984) ). This aspect will therefore not be pursued further in this study.
The second aspect is that there are days where no trading has occurred resulting in no registered stock price. Generally two methods are used to handle this problem. One is to use fairly arbitrary restrictions on the trading frequency to remove stocks from the sample that are traded infrequently. This, however, results in small samples that are not representative of the entire stock market. The second method is to use a procedure to allocate the multiperiod return on a given trading day over the previous interval, where the stock was not traded. Maynes & Rumsey (1993) investigate three such procedures. The first is the "lumped" procedure, which allocates the entire return to the day the stock is traded, while the return on days with no trade is set to zero. The "uniform" procedure distributes the multiperiod return from a day of trade equally over the multiperiod interval. The last procedure is the "trade-to-trade" which directly uses the multiperiod returns instead of allocating them over the interval. In their simulation study Maynes & Rumsey (1993) find that while the lumped and uniform procedures give misspecified results, trade-to-trade returns give correct conclusions for all levels of trading frequency. In this study we will apply as lenient trading frequency restrictions as possible in order to maintain as large a sample size as possible and use the trade-to-trade return allocation procedure to account for the thin trading.
The trade-to-trade procedure requires a number of extensions. Since the procedure uses multiperiod returns, matching multiperiod returns must be generated for the market index. Additionally, a trade-to-trade version of the market model must be used. Maynes & Rumsey (1993) assume an underlying stationary one-day return generating process and derive the trade-to-trade market model as
where n t is the period length of day t's multiperiod return, while R j,nt and R m,nt are multiperiod returns for stock j and the market index, respectively. The residuals in the model are heteroskedastic with variance equal to n t σ 2 j , which makes it necessary to divide the data with the square root of the multiperiod return length, when estimating the model's parameters. The abnormal return in the event window AR j,t for the jth PAA at day t is then
Finally, we note that when trade-to-trade returns are generated for the estimation period, uniform returns will be used in the event window to enable using cross-sectional regressions to disentangle the effects. Therefore the above formula for ARs in effect has n t = 1. We calculate abnormal returns for the day of the announcement and the day after. As is standard in the literature this is done to take into account that some announcements are made late in the day after the stock market has closed, delaying the stock market reaction until the following day. The abnormal returns for these two days are then cumulated into a measure of cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) that is used as the dependent variable in the cross sectional regressions.
B Calculating Dividend and Earnings Surprises
To isolate the element of new information contained in the announcement we define the surprise component of the announcement as the announcement minus an assessment of the market's expectation of this announcement. As a starting point we define these dividend and earnings surprises in a manner as consistent with Conroy et al. (2000) as possible. This is done in order to ensure the highest degree of comparability between the studies. Later as a sensitivity analysis we will examine the effects on the results of using different definitions of the surprise components.
However, we do deviate from Conroy et al. (2000) in that dividend surprises are defined as dividend changes. In section IV we present justification for why this deviation seems necessary in Danish data. Dividend surprises DS are therefore defined as
This continuous variable is then transformed into a grouped variable in the following manner:
In defining the surprise component of current earnings we use consensus analyst forecasts from the International Brokerage Estimate System (IBES) 2 as a proxy for the market's expectation of current earnings. The IBES estimates are forecasts of eps excluding discontinued operations, extra-ordinary charges, and other non-operating items. The measure of current eps must therefore correspond to this definition. The I/B/E/S database provides such an adjusted measure of current eps, which we will use in calculating current earnings surprises. The current earnings surprise is defined as a percentage deviation as follows 
Similarly the surprise component in management's forecasts of next year's earnings (EPS1) is defined using IBES forecasts of next year's earnings. The percentage deviation is calculated as
|IBES forecast earnings1|
A complication in calculating this deviation is that the management forecasts are given in different measures. To avoid any errors that could occur from transforming these into eps, IBES forecasts are collected in the same measure as the management forecast is given. ES1 is then calculated directly from these measures. It is also common that the management forecasts are given as a range. When this is the case the midpoint of the range is used, as is standard in the literature. The grouped variable EGROUP1 is defined analogously to EGROUP0 using ES1.
III Data
The sample is constructed from firms listed on the CSE from 1999 to 2004. To ensure that the PAAs are fairly congruent in their information content, we are only interested in companies that report earnings in accordance with the Danish Companies Account Act. This excludes banks and insurance companies from the study. The PAA dates for the above companies in the period 1999 to 2004 are extracted from Stockwise, which is CSE's database of stock exchange announcements. This resulted in a sample consisting of 215 companies and 1052 PAAs. In order to include a PAA in the study we require that the company's stock is listed on the CSE the first day of the estimation period for a given PAA. This reduces the sample to 214 companies and 1034 PAAs. The Danish stock market is characterized by having many stocks that are traded infrequently. In event studies of stock markets with thin trading it is common practice to place certain demands on the trading frequency of a stock in order for it to be included in the study. As mentioned before we will use as lenient restrictions as possible. Our restrictions require that the stock is traded in at least 1/3 of the estimation period and either the day after the PAA or at least one day in the period after. This reduces the sample to 661 PAAs. Additionally, some of these PAAs pertain to dual class shares. So as not to enhance any potential problem of event clustering, we delete the less frequently traded of the dual class shares, thereby ensuring that each PAA is only included in the sample once. This reduces the sample to 626 PAAs. In order to control for the confounding effect of other announcements made around the PAA we delete any PAA, where an announcement not pertaining to the PAA is made in the window starting 3 days before the PAA and running until the day after the PAA. This reduces the sample to 430 PAAs.
In addition to the dates of the PAAs, the data material consists of the individual stock's total return index, market value of equity, and turnover by volume collected from Datastream. The total return indices are corrected for dividends and any changes in the capital structure, and are therefore used directly to calculate daily returns of the stocks. The market index is collected from the CSE and is the Exchange's all-share index, KAX. The analysts' forecasts used in the study are consensus forecasts from the International Brokerage Estimate System (IBES). These forecasts are obtained from the I/B/E/S database along with the actual current earnings.
We require that data is available for IBES forecasts of current and next year's earnings, which reduces the sample to 303 observations. Finally there are instances where the management forecasts of next year's earnings given in the PAA are so vague that it is not possible to construct an estimate of next year's earnings. Deleting these reduces the sample to 247 observations.
IV Patterns in Dividend and Earnings Surprises
In this section we examine the patterns in Danish dividend and earnings surprises. In table I we present evidence on actual dividend changes in our sample and analyst's forecasts of these. From the first row in the table it is observed that in more than half of the announcements there is no dividend change, that is this year's dividend is equal to last year's. Danish dividends therefore show a high degree of stability, a phenomenon that has also been observed in the literature pertaining to dividend announcements in other countries. Additionally, it can be seen that while 32% of the dividend surprises are positive only 12.9% of them are negative. So although dividend increases are fairly common dividend cuts are more infrequent. In this sense it seems that Denmark is similar to the United States and other countries in that dividends tend to be rather stable with companies refraining from dividend cuts when possible. Comparing these results to those of Conroy et al. (2000), however, it is clear that the stability of dividends is less pronounced in Denmark than in Japan. While 55% of our sample involves no change in the dividend from one year to the next more than 70% of their sample observes no dividend change. This highlights the extreme stability of Japanese dividends mentioned earlier that possibly limits Japanese dividends ability to function as signals.
Insert table I here
Comparing the first and second rows of the table we see that analysts forecast more increases and decreases in dividends than actually occur. From the last row of the table we see that analyst forecasts are rarely accurate, since it is only in 30% of the cases that the current dividend equals the IBES forecast. This result is striking since a comparison of the first and last row of the table indicates that analyst forecasts perform worse than a simple random walk forecast that sets this year's dividend equal to last year's. Such a forecast will be correct for more than half of the announced dividends, while this will only be the case for analyst forecasts in less than a third of the announcements. Given this it does not seem rational to assume that analyst's forecasts of dividends provide an accurate proxy for the market's expectations of dividends in Denmark. As mentioned earlier we will therefore in the following measure the dividend surprise as the difference between this year's and last year's dividend. Although this represents a deviation from Conroy et al. (2000), we feel that this is justified given the evidenced poor performance of analyst forecasts of dividends in Denmark. Table II illustrates the relationship between dividend and current earnings surprises. First it is observed that there is a slight tendency for the earnings surprise to be negative. The previously mentioned stability of dividends is underscored by the fact that although almost 40% of the sample represents a negative earnings surprise only 15% of these companies with negative earnings surprises cut their dividends.
Insert table II here

Insert table III here
Table III takes a closer look at the relationship between the dividend surprise and the surprise contained in management's forecasts of next year's earnings.
There is a tendency for the management forecast of next year's earnings to contain a negative element of surprise. Again a striking result is that while almost half of the sample involves a negative surprise in the management forecast of next year's earnings only 19% of these firms cut dividends with a greater share (21%) actually choosing to increase the dividend. In addition it is interesting that only a third of those companies increasing dividends are doing this on the basis of a positive element of surprise in management's forecast of next year's earnings.
Insert table IV here
In table IV the connection between the current earnings surprise and next year's earnings surprise is examined. Here it is noteworthy that in half of the announcements it is the case that the surprise component in current earnings and management's forecast of next year's earnings is the same, i.e. when the current earnings surprise is positive next year's earnings surprise is also positive. In spite of this the correlation coefficient of 0.21 between the two grouped variables for current and next year's earnings surprise, EGROUP0 and EGROUP1 is fairly low. In particular it does not seem high enough to induce a potential problem of multicollinearity in the regressions in the following section that include both variables. 2000), since they find an insignificant coefficient. This first result therefore tends to support the hypothesis that the findings of Conroy et al. (2000) should be interpreted more as a result of unique Japanese circumstances than as support for the dividend irrelevance proposition. In regressions (2) and (3) we attempt to explain the stock market reaction using the two earnings surprises separately. Both coefficients in these two regressions are positive, but while the coefficient on the current earnings surprise is only significant at a 10% level the coefficient on next year's earnings surprise is significant at a 1% level. This fact and the much larger explanatory power of the latter regression seems to indicate that the information content of the surprise in management's forecasts of next year's earnings is much larger than that of the surprise component of current earnings. This interpretation is supported by regression (4), where both earnings surprise variables are included.
V Stock Market Reaction to Dividend and Earnings Surprises
Here we see that only the coefficient on next year's earnings surprise remains significant. Thus it seems that the surprise in next year's earnings carries much more information to the market than the surprise in current earnings, which can be interpreted as indicating that the stock market is reacting to expectations about the future rather than announcements of past performance.
Insert table V here
Regressions (5) - (7) present results using different combinations of dividend and earnings surprises. What is striking here is that the coefficient on the dividend surprise variable is positive and remains significant at a 5% level in all of the regressions. Additionally, it can be seen that once either the dividend surprise or next year's earnings surprise is controlled for there is no announcement effect in current earnings surprises. This result of a significant effect of dividend surprises is in contrast with the results of Conroy et al. (2000), since they only find an announcement effect for the surprise component of management's forecast of next year's dividend. Thus it seems that even after controlling for the informational effect of management forecasts of next year's earnings, there is a stock price reaction to dividend surprises in Denmark. At a minimum this can be interpreted as evidence that dividend surprises contain a signal to the market above and beyond that, which is contained in management's forecasts of next year's earnings. At a higher level this result, in contrast with those in Conroy et al. (2000), does not seem to support the dividend irrelevancy proposition, since even after controlling for information about future expectations the stock market still seems to react to dividend surprises. Since there is still the possibility that the reaction is caused by dividends containing a signal above and beyond that in management's forecasts, our results do not allow us to completely reject the dividend irrelevancy proposition. However, it is important to note that this is not unique to this study. Had Conroy et al. (2000) found a significant reaction to current dividend surprises they too would have been unable to completely reject the dividend irrelevancy hypothesis, since such results would also have been open to the interpretation that current dividends contain a signal above and beyond that in management's forecasts of next year's earnings and dividends. Thus, their ability to disentangle the real and informational effects of dividends is not as strong as they suggest, and most importantly seems to hinge critically on their finding of no reaction to current dividend surprises.
The most interesting aspect in the present study is that, contrary to Conroy et al. (2000), our results do not allow us to accept the dividend irrelevancy proposition. Thus our results support the hypothesis that the higher level of information asymmetry and agency costs in Denmark compared to Japan leaves a role for dividend surprises after management's expectations for the future have been taken into account.
VI Robustness Analysis
The robustness of the above results is tested by conducting the regression analysis with various other specifications of the independent variables. In particular we examine the effects of using continuous earnings surprise variables rather than grouped variables, allowing for an asymmetry in the market reaction to dividend and earnings surprises and including extraordinary dividends in the dividend surprise measure.
A Continuous Earnings Surprise Variables
The regression results of table V indicated that current earnings surprises had no impact on share price once the effect of next year's earnings surprise was taken into account. To asses the robustness of this result we now define the earnings surprise variables as continuous variables. Christie (1987) concludes that the correct measure of earnings surprise involves deflating the difference between current earnings and the market's expectations by the market value of equity at the beginning of the period. We therefore define our continuous measures of current earnings surprise as ES0 = actual EP S − IBES f orecast EP S market value of equity while the measure of next year's earnings surprise is defined as ES1 = M anagement f orecast EP S1 − IBES forecast EP S1 market value of equity When ES1 is constructed and used in this manner it must be based on the same measure of earnings. For consistency with ES0 we choose to construct ES1 using eps. We therefore now require management and IBES forecasts of next year's eps as well as the market value of equity at the beginning of the period. These new requirements reduce the sample size to 99 observations. The results from these regressions are quite different from those presented in table V. The grouped dividend surprise variable is now only significant when it is the only variable included in the regression, and only at a 10% significance level. Additionally, while the continuous measure of both the current and next year's earnings surprise are significant individually, it is only the current earnings surprise that is significant when they are included in regressions together. This indicates that contrary to the findings with grouped variables, the continuous current earnings surprise contains all the relevant information that the market reacts to. However, given the large reduction in sample size interpretation of these results should be done cautiously. In particular given the fairly rare occurrence of a dividend change, it is perhaps not surprising that this variable is insignificant in a sample size of 99.
To attempt to uncover if the small sample size is driving the above results, we examine results from regressions that use a grouped variable for the dividend change and next year's earnings surprise and the above continuous variable for the current earnings surprise. The results of these regressions are similar to those reported in table V, indicating that the above results were indeed driven by the small sample size. As in Conroy et al. (2000) we therefore find that there is little gain to using continuous variables. In line with our previous results, we conclude that the market reaction to PAAs is driven by the dividend change and surprise component in management's forecast of next year's earnings.
B Asymmetry in the Reaction to Dividend and Earnings Surprises
Previous empirical studies of dividend announcements have documented an asymmetry in the reaction to dividend announcements in that the market reacts more strongly to dividend decreases than increases. To allow for this effect we define two dummy variables for each of the three surprise variables. The first dummy for a given surprise variable assumes the value 1 when the surprise is positive and zero otherwise, while the second dummy variable for this surprise measure assumes a value of 1 when the surprise is negative and zero otherwise. We then regress the cumulated abnormal returns on combinations of these 6 dummy variables. Surprisingly, our results indicate a significant market reaction to dividend increases, while dividend decreases seem to have no effect. In all regressions including the dummies for the dividend surprise it is only the positive coefficient for the positive dummy variable that is significant. This finding indicates a clear asymmetry in the market's reaction to dividend changes, yet contradicts the findings of previous studies since only the dividend increase seems to have an effect.
Additionally, the results clearly indicate that the announcement effect of management forecasts of next year's earnings is driven by the negative surprises. In all regressions including the dummies for next year's earnings surprise it is only the negative coefficient for the negative dummy variable that is significant, and indeed always highly significant at a 1% level. This indicates that while the stock market reacts negatively to management forecasts of next year's earnings that are below the market's expectations, it is indifferent to positive surprises. Thus it seems that there is a clear asymmetry in the stock market's reaction to next year's earnings surprises.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the explanatory power of a regression that only includes the dummy variables for a dividend increase and a management forecast below market expectations increases to 8.4%. Although the explanatory power of the regression is still low it is quite an improvement over the explanatory power of the regressions in table V.
C Extraordinary Dividends
The preceding results only pertained to announcements of ordinary dividends in that any extraordinary dividends were not included. We now relax this restriction and also include any extraordinary dividends in the definition of current and last year's dividends. Extraordinary dividends are only announced in seven instances and including these instances in the definition of dividends does not qualitatively change the results of the first regression analysis.
VII Conclusion
This study draws on the simultaneous announcement of current dividends, current earnings and management's forecasts of next year's earnings to provide an analysis of the informational and real effect of dividend announcements. While not being the first study to analyze simultaneous announcements of these three variables, it is the first study to do this in an environment characterized by informational asymmetry and agency costs, characteristics that are proposed to be crucial to the existence of informational and real effects of dividends.
Our results indicate that the stock market reacts to the component of surprise in dividend announcements and management's forecast of next year's earnings. There is no indication of a reaction to the surprise component in announcements of current earnings. At a minimum our results can be interpreted as indicating that dividend surprises contain an informational effect above and beyond that contained in management's forecast of next year's earnings. If it is assumed that management's forecasts of next year's earnings adequately control for any informational effect, the results can be interpreted to indicate that there is a real effect of dividends. Such an interpretation would be in contradiction with the dividend irrelevancy proposition.
While our results do not reject the dividend irrelevancy hypothesis outright, they certainly do not lend support to this. At the same time our results underscore the importance of taking the institutional environment into account when interpreting results, in that in an environment with informational asymmetries and agency costs we find results that differ from those found in an environment characterized by low levels of these elements.
Notes
1 During our period of interest 1 EURO was approximately equal to 7.5 DKK.
2 The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Thomson Financial for providing earnings per share forecast data, available through the Institutional Brokers Estimate System. This data has been provided as part of a broad academic program to encourage earnings expectations research. Pearson Correlation (DGROUP0, EGROUP0) = 0.18 Pearson Correlation (DGROUP0, EGROUP1) = 0.18 Entries represent the number of announcements falling in a given category and this number as a percentage of total announcements. The sample consists of preliminary annual account announcements (PAAs) in the period 1999 -2004 for firms listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. Observations with other announcements not directly pertaining to the PAA that are announced in the period from 3 days before the PAA to 1 day after are deleted. Additionally, we require IBES forecasts of current and next year's earnings and that the PAA contains a management forecast of next year's earnings. This gives a sample with 247 observations. Current earnings surprises are measured as the deviation between the announced current earnings and consensus analyst forecasts of earnings from IBES. ES0 is the announced current earnings minus the IBES consensus forecast of the earnings divided by the absolute value of the IBES forecast. Next year's earnings surprises are measured as the deviation between the management forecasts of next year's earnings and consensus analyst forecasts of next year's earnings from IBES. ES1 is the announced management forecast of next year's earnings minus the IBES consensus forecast of next year's earnings divided by the absolute value of the IBES forecast. EGROUP0 is set to -1 if the announced current earnings are more than 10% below the IBES consesus analyst forecast of current earnings, zero if current earnings are within 10% of the forecast, and 1 if current earnings are more than 10% above the IBES forecast. EGROUP1 is defined in a similar manner based on ES1.
Current Earnings Next Year's Earnings Surprise Surprise
ES1 < -10% -10% < ES1 < 10% ES1 > 10% Total ES0 < -10% Pearson Correlation (EGROUP0, EGROUP1) = 0.21 Abnormal returns are calculated for the day of the preliminary annual account announcement (PAA) and the day after using the market model as a benchmark. The cumulated abnormal returns for these two days is the dependant variable in the regression. This variable is regressed on a constant and the independent variables that are measures of the dividend and earnings surprises. DGROUP0 is defined as -1 if the announced dividend is less than last year's dividend, zero if it is equal to last year's dividend, and 1 if it is larger than last year's dividend. EGROUP0 is set to -1 if the announced current earnings are more than 10% below the IBES consesus analyst forecast of current earnings, zero if current earnings are within 10% of the forecast, and 1 if current earnings are more than 10% above the IBES forecast. EGROUP1 is defined analogously based on management forecasts of next year's earnings and IBES consensus analyst forecasts of next year's earnings. *, **, and *** denote that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, or 0.01 significance levels (two-tailed test), respectively.
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